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Abstract
This paper revisits Schumpeterian destruction in a DSGEmodel based on monopolistic
competition. Firms enter the market through a free entry condition and exit endogenously
depending on their speciÖc productivity level. The mechanism of endogenous destruction
among heterogeneous Örms is based on the probabilistic argument discussed in Melitz
(2003). The models in the paper are successful in reproducing observed business cycle
patterns for creation and destruction and other major economic variables. The models
also feature typical characteristics of Schumpeterian economies as found in literature.
Keywords: entry and exit, Örm heterogeneity, the Schumpeterian destruction, business
cycles
JEL classiÖcation: D24, E23, E32, L11, L60
1. Introduction
High establishment and job turnover during the business cycle has been documented
in the literature (Davis and Haltiwanger 1992, Davis et al. 1998, Dunne et al. 1998, 1999).
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Figure 1 conÖrms these facts using recent U.S. data. The upper panel shows the cyclical
components of real GDP, as well as manufacturing establishment entry and exit from
1977 to 2009.1 First, entry and exit of Örms are highly volatile: their percent standard
deviations are 4.62 and 5.22, respectively, whereas that of real GDP is 1.33. Second,
they show a clear cyclical pattern: while entry is highly procyclical, exit is countercyclical
with a smaller magnitude. Contemporaneous correlations of entry and exit with real
GDP are 0.43 and -0.15 for the same period. The lower panel in the Ögure provides
cyclical components of job creation and destruction; These can be interpreted as the
employment-weighted establishment entry and exit rates. They show a similar pattern
to establishment dynamics. Standard deviations of job creation and destruction are 8.52
and 11.53, respectively. Their correlations with real GDP are 0.73 and -0.51.
The dynamics of entry and exit and induced job áuctuations has motivated a num-
ber of theoretical models (Hopenhayn 1992a, 1992b, Caballero and Hammour 1994, 1996,
2005, Campbell 1998, Samaniego 2008, Lee and Mukoyama 2008). These models typically
feature the so-called Schumpeterian destruction, i.e., endogenous exit of less productive
production units, with which the observed pattern of destruction dynamics can be repli-
cated.
In this paper, I present a simple analytical framework which captures the Schum-
peterian destruction in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model based on
monopolistic competition. A parsimonious extension to Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and
Bilbiie et al. (2007) generates an endogenous destruction among heterogeneous Örms.2
I emphasize, besides creation, "destruction margins" in dynamics of extensive margins,
i.e., áuctuations in the number of Örms/product varieties. The theoretical models in this
paper are capable of reproducing observed business cycle patterns for the U.S. economy,
1See Appendix A about the data. All series in the Ögure are detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott
Ölter. Its smoothing parameter is set to 6.25.
2Although Ghironi and Melitz (2005) feature a Schumpeterian endogenous destruction of exporters
based on heterogeneous productivity, the total number of domestic Örms are forced to exit only by an
exogenous destruction shock.
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especially the high volatility and countercyclicality of destruction margins. The models
perform as well as standard real business cycle models without endogenous destruction
for other principal variables.
In this paper, the mechanism whereby the Schumpeterian destruction takes place is
rather simple, relying principally on the probabilistic argument in Melitz (2003). Upon
entry, new entrants draw a speciÖc productivity level from a given distribution and pay
sunk entry costs. For production in the next period, they must incur Öxed operational
costs. Following an aggregated shock, less e¢cient Örms which fail to a§ord Öxed oper-
ational costs are forced to shut down their production plant and exit. Only a subset of
e¢cient Örms among potential producers actually engage in production activity.
In the benchmark economy, all new entrants enter regardless of their speciÖc produc-
tivity level. An identical entry process is assumed. As a natural extension, I consider
"heterogeneous" entry in which a preselection at entry level occurs based on the Örmís
speciÖc heterogeneous productivity level. As a result, in this extended version, we can
know which Örm enters as well as which Örm exits. Although the entry selection model
is richer in this instance, both Schumpeterian economies behave quantitatively in a very
similar manner.
The models in this paper can replicate various characteristics which are typical to the
Schumpeterian economy. A recessionary shock wipes less e¢cient Örms out and allocates
resources toward more e¢cient Örms. This is the "cleansing e§ect of recessions" (Caballero
and Hammour 1994). In contrast, there is "sclerosis", i.e. the survival of production units
that would not survive in an e¢cient equilibrium (Caballero and Hammour 2005) in the
non-Schumpeterian economy.
As is expected, creation and destruction margins are very sensitive to the cyclical
proprieties of Öxed operational and sunk entry costs. Indeed, destruction may decrease
along the recovery because of cheaper Öxed operational costs due to lower wages induced
by a recessionary shock. The recovery from the recession may take place with a lower level
of destruction rather than a higher level of creation. Such a pattern matches the "reverse-
liquidationist view" argued in Caballero and Hammour (2005). Furthermore, when sunk
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entry costs rise sharply following a recessionary shock, a high reduction in creation margins
that follows can "insulate" a rise in destruction (Caballero and Hammour 1994). Because
of such a sharp reduction in creation margins, which alleviates the pressure on labor
demand and realizes lower wages, destruction margins can end up being shielded along
the pass of recovery.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, the benchmark and
entry selection model are presented. I also present a model without endogenous Schum-
peterian destruction in Section 4. Through Section 5, calibration exercises are conducted.
SpeciÖcally, impulse response functions and second moments of the theoretical models are
documented. Sensitivity analyses against parameters which govern the cyclical patterns
of Öxed operational and sunk entry costs are performed in Section 6. I conclude brieáy
in the last section.
2. The model
The economy is inhabited by one unit mass of atomic households. Extensive margins
appear as a result of investment, which is driven by households smoothing their consump-
tion. Each Örm represents one product variety. Firms draw their speciÖc productivity
level from a distribution upon entry and pay sunk entry costs. Firms are also required
to pay Öxed operational costs from the next period. Both sunk entry and Öxed opera-
tional costs are paid in terms of e§ective labor. Ine¢cient Örms which cannot a§ord Öxed
operational costs are forced to shut down without producing.
2.1. Households
The representative household maximizes the expected discounted sum of utilities,
Et
P1
i=t 
itUt, where  (< 1) denotes a discount factor. The utility at time t depends on
consumption Ct and labor supply Lt as follows
Ut = lnCt  L
1+ 1
'
t
1 + 1
'
. (1)
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The parameter  (> 0) represents the degree of non-satisfaction in supplying labor and
' stands for the Frisch elasticity of labor supply3. With the above speciÖcation, the
marginal disutility in providing one unit of additional labor is increasing.
Consumption is deÖned over a continuum of goods . At any given time t, only a
subset of goods t 2  is available as
Ct = Vt
Z
!2t
ct(!)
1 1
 d!
 1
1 1
; (2)
where ct (!) is individual demand for variety ! and Vt  S 
1
1
t in which St denotes
the number of available varieties at time t. Following Benassy (1996),  represents the
marginal utility associated with one additional increase in the number of varieties in the
basket. When  = 1= (  1), the preference coincides to those implied by Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977).  (> 1) stands for the elasticity of substitution among varieties.
2.1.1. Law of motion and budget constraint
Nt denotes the number of potential producers. "Potential", because only a subset of St
e¢cient Örms actually engage in production. New entrants, whose number is denoted by
Ht, need one "time to build" in order to become potential producers in the next period. A
fraction of  among potential producers and new entrants are assumed to exit exogenously
in each period. These assumptions imply that the number of potential producers at time
t is given by
Nt = (1 ) (Nt1 +Ht1) : (3)
Following Caballero and Hammour (2005), I distinguish between the number of Örms
destroyed via endogenous-Schumpeterian and those destroyed exogenously. Respectively,
they are deÖned as
DSt  Nt  St and Dt   (St +Ht) . (4)
3With ' = 1 the marginal disutility of supplying labor becomes constant, . When ' = 0 the
marginal disutility becomes inÖnite and the labor supply becomes inelastic.
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Gross destruction at time t is then given by
Dt  DSt +Dt . (5)
I choose the price of consumption basket Pt as numÈraire and let tilda () stand for
the average level. Using this notation, the period-by-period real budget constraint for the
representative household is given by
Ct + xt+1vt (Nt +Ht) = Ltwt + xtNt

vt + edt : (6)
vt denotes the real share price of a mutual fund among Nt potential producers and Ht
new entrants. At time t, the household purchases consumption goods and a share of the
mutual fund, xt+1. wt and edt denote the real wage and the average real dividends among
Nt potential producers, respectively. As revenue, the household receives labor income and
the return of fund based on share holdings in the previous period, xt.
2.1.2. First order conditions
The representative household maximizes Ut with respect to Ct, xt+1 and Lt under the
budget constraint (6) for every period. The Örst-order condition with respect to labor
supply Lt gives
 (Lt)
1
 = wtC
1
t : (7)
Taking into account the motion of Örms (3), the Örst-order condition with respect to
share holdings xt+1 gives
vt =  (1 )Et

Ct+1
Ct
1 
vt+1 + edt+1 : (8)
Iterating forward and ruling out the Ponzi schema in the above expression, we have
vt = Et
1X
i=t+1
[ (1 )]it

Ci
Ct
1 edi: (9)
The current asset price vt can be expressed as the expected discounted sum of future
dividends.
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The optimal consumption for a variety ! is given by
ct (!) = V
1
t

pt (!)
Pt

Ct. (10)
The price index which minimizes nominal expenditures is
Pt =
1
Vt
Z St
0
pt (!)
1 d!
 1
1
. (11)
Given a preference for variety, the price index rises (decreases) when the number of avail-
able varieties St decreases (rises).
2.2. Heterogeneous Örms and Schumpeterian destruction
2.2.1. Entry
Firms are monopolistically competitive and each Örm produces one speciÖc product
variety. Upon entry, new entrants draw a Örm-speciÖc productivity level z from a c.d.f,
G(z), which is deÖned as the following Pareto distribution:
G(z) = 1
zmin
z
k
; (12)
where zmin is the minimum productivity level and k (>   1) is the parameter which
governs the shape of the distribution.4 As k rises, the distribution becomes more skewed
towards the minimum level and heterogeneity decreases. In this benchmark model, entry
is assumed to be "identical"; After drawing its speciÖc productivity level, every Örm enters
and pay a sunk entry cost which consists of lE;t  fE;t=A#t units of e§ective labor. In the
above expression, fE;t is exogenous and represents (de)regulation on entry. At stands for
the labor productivity level which is common for all Örms and the parameter # governs
its spillover to the e¢ciency of workers in the Örm setup activity.
In equilibrium, the following free entry condition (which equates current share price
vt and sunk entry costs) must hold, pinning down the number of new entrants Ht:
4Hopenhayn (1992b), Hopenhayn (1992a) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) consider uncertainty
of the Örm-speciÖc productivity level. As we will see, in this paperís model, uncertainty holds only on
the aggregated productivity level At.
7
vt =
wtfE;t
A#t
: (13)
2.2.2. Production
A Örmís production technology, given a productivity level z, is summarized by
lt (z) =
yt (z)
Atz
+
ft
At
; (14)
where lt (z) stands for labor demand for production. yt (z) denotes the scale of production,
i.e., intensive margins. In addition to variable costs, yt (z) =Atz, production requires
operational Öxed costs which are deÖned in terms of e§ective labor: ft=At . These Öxed
costs are assumed to áuctuate along the aggregated labor productivity level At with a
degree of spillover . ft is exogenous and represents (de)regulation on production.
Provided (14), operational real proÖts of the Örm are expressed as
dt (z) =

t (z)
wt
Atz

yt (z) wtft
At
; (15)
where t (z) stands for real price. The goods market clearing condition requires that
yt (z) = ct (z) and, taking into account the demand addressed to each Örm (10), the
maximization of proÖts gives a standard pricing in monopolistic competition. The real
price is markup over real marginal costs:
t (z) =

  1
wt
Atz
: (16)
Using the above optimal pricing, proÖts can be rewritten as
dt (z) =
1

S
 (1)1
t t (z)
1 Ct  wtft
At
: (17)
Since  > 1, lower real price induces a rise in proÖts. The term S (1)1t captures
additional impact on proÖts arising from áuctuations in extensive margins. When  =
1=(  1), this term is unity.
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2.2.3. The cuto§ Örm and the number of survivors-producers
Provided with a speciÖc productivity level z, the Örm produces if dt (z) > 0, otherwise
it shuts down the plant and exits. Survival depends on how low of a price Örms can
charge, which in turn depends on their marginal costs. Ine¢cient Örms which have drawn
a lower productivity level than the cuto§ (z  zs;t) exit without producing. Endogenous
Schumpeterian destruction takes place following a "strict productivity ranking" as in
Caballero and Hammour (1994, 1996, 2005).
Operational proÖts become zero for the Örm with the cuto§ productivity level zs;t
providing the following zero proÖt cuto§ (ZCP) condition in equilibrium:
dt (zs;t) =
1

S
 (1)1
t t (zs;t)
1 Ct  wtft
At
= 0: (18)
We rewrite the above ZCP condition in terms of the average Örm speciÖc productivity
among survivors-producers, ezs;t. Following Melitz (2003) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005),ezs;t is deÖned as follows,
ezs;t  " 1
1G(zs;t)
Z 1
zs;t
z1dG(z)
# 1
1
= zs;t

k
k  (  1)
 1
1
(19)
The second identity comes from the use of the Pareto distribution deÖned previously.
Average real proÖts among surviving producers are expressed as follows
eds;t = 1

S
 (1)1
t e1s;t Ct  wtftAt ;
where average real price is given by
es;t =   1 wtAtezs;t : (20)
At the same time, by deÖnition of the price index (11), we have es;t = S t . Using this
latter expression, average proÖts are rewritten as
eds;t = 1

Ct
St
 wtft
At
; (21)
Finally, using (18), (19) and (21), the ZCP is rewritten as
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1
Ct
St
=
k
k  (  1)
wtft
At
: (22)
Using average Örm productivity and the Pareto density function, the Schumpeterian
survival rate is
St
Nt
= zkmin

k
k  (  1)
 k
1 ezks;t : (23)
In the end, average operational proÖts among potential producers are given by
edt = St
Nt
eds;t: (24)
2.3. Labor market clearing
Labor markets should be clear in equilibrium. Lt units of endogenously supplied labor
forces are employed in the production of goods (intensive margins) and creation of Örms
(extensive margins):
Lt = Stlt (ezs;t) +HtlE;t: (25)
The above condition can be further developed as follows5
Lt = St
"
(  1)
eds;t
wt
+ 
ft
At
#
+Ht
vt
wt
: (26)
This condition is equivalent to the aggregated identity which can be obtained by summing
budget constraints among households: Yt  Ct + vtHt = Ltwt + St eds;t, whereby Yt stands
for real GDP measured in welfare basis from expenditures and income. In total, the
model consists of 11 equations and 11 endogenously determined variables among which
the number of potential producers, Nt, behaves like a state variable. Table 1 summarizes
the benchmark model.
5Note that eds;t = es;t

eys:t  wtft
At
;
where eys;t is average intensive margins.
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Table 1: Summary of the benchmark model
Average pricing es;t = 1 wtAtezs;t
Variety e§ect es;t = S t
Average survivorsí proÖts eds;t = 1 CtSt  wtftAt
Average proÖts edt = StNt eds;t
Free entry condition vt =
wtfE;t
A#t
Motion of Örms Nt+1 = (1 ) (Nt +Ht)
Euler equation vt =  (1 )Et

Ct+1
Ct
1 
vt+1 + edt+1
Optimal labor supply  (Lt)
1
 = wtC
1
t
ZCP 1

Ct
St
= k
k(1)
wtft
At
Schumpeterian surviving rate St
Nt
= zkmin
h
k
k(1)
i k
1 ezks;t
Labor market clearing Lt = St
h
(  1) eds;t
wt
+  ft
At
i
+Ht
vt
wt
3. Entry selection
In the benchmark model, we know which Örms exit: less e¢cient Örms. However, we
do not know which Örms enter since entry is assumed to be identical. As an extension, I
introduce preselection in entry.
Upon entry, "potential" entrants draw a productivity level from the same Pareto
distribution G(z). Among NE;t potential entrants, however, only a subset of Ht Örms
actually enter and their entry costs are Önanced by households. In equilibrium, the
expected Örm value multiplied by the probability of successful entry must be equal to
sunk entry costs, providing the following free entry condition:6
Ht
NE;t
vt =
wtfE;t
A#t
: (27)
Less e¢cient potential entrants who have drawn a lower productivity level than the
cuto§ give up to enter. I assume for the sake of simplicity that Örms never try to enter
6This is considered an R&D process to get an innovative idea which materializes. Lee and Mukoyama
(2008) also consider such preselection in entry.
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again once they are eliminated in this preselection. The Örm with the cuto§ productivity
level zh;t sees v (zh;t) = 0, implying Etdt+1 (zh;t) = 0, which gives the following zero cuto§
proÖt condition for entry (ZCPE)7
1

Et
"
St+1
Nt+1
Ct+1
St+1
 ezh;tezs;t+1
1#
=
k
k  (  1)Et

St+1
Nt+1
wt+1ft+1
At+1

: (28)
Using the Pareto distribution G(z) deÖned previously, we have
Ht
NE;t
= zkmin

k
k  (  1)
 k
1 ezkh;t : (29)
The above two equations determine ezh;t and Ht.
Because the number of new entrants which do enter always amounts to Ht, the labor
market clearing condition (26) remains the same as in the previous model while the free
entry condition is modiÖed as in (27). Finally, with the extended version, the model
contains two additional equations, (28) and (29), and two additional variables, NE;t andezh;t.
Accordingly, in the entry selection model, the number of destroyed Örms at entry is
deÖned as
DHt  NE;t Ht. (30)
Gross destruction at time t is then given by
Dt  DSt +Dt +DHt . (31)
where DSt and D

t have the same deÖnition as in the benchmark model.
4. A model without Schumpeterian destruction
It would be particularly useful to consider a model without endogenous Schumpeterian
destruction. Such a model is obtained by removing operational Öxed costs. That is, setting
7See Appendix B for the derivation.
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ft = 0 for all periods. This implies that Nt = St since every potential producer produces
regardless of their speciÖc productivity level. From (23), the average productivity level
of producers remains at its steady state level: ezs;t = ezs. Therefore, a non-Schumpeterian
economy contains two less equations compared to the benchmark model.
5. Calibration
5.1. Choice of parametersí values, the non-stochastic steady state and productivity process
Table 2: Parametrization for the benchmark economy
 discount factor 0:96
' Frisch elasticity of labor supply 2
 elasticity of substitution among varieties 3:8
 love for variety 1=(  1)
 death shock 0:01
Calibration is performed on an annual basis. The parameters in the models are chosen
as in Table 2. The value of discount factor () and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
(') are set to 0:96 and 2, respectively. These values are well in the range used in the
literature.
The elasticity of substitution among varieties () is set to 3.8, following Ghironi and
Melitz (2005) who choose it based on empirical Öndings of Bernard et al. (2003) about
U.S. manufacturing plants and macro trade data. Bernard et al. (2003) also document
that the standard deviation of log U.S. plant sales is 1.67. The corresponding standard
deviation in the theoretical model is given by 1=(k +1), according to which the value
of k is provided. I set  , the love for variety, at 1=(  1) according to the Dixit-Stiglitz
preference. The destruction rate () is set to 0:01, implying that one percent of potential
producers exit exogenously per year on average.
Variables in the non-stochastic steady state are expressed without a time index. I
assume that A = fE = zmin = 1 without loss of generality. The average annual destruction
rate of U.S. manufacturing establishment is 0:093 in the data. In the benchmark model, I
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set f (the steady state value of subsides) to 0:0073 so that the Schumpeterian endogenous
destruction rate, 1  S=N , becomes 0:083 provided the value of . In the same manner,
for the extended version of the model, f is set to 0:0079 so as to replicate the annual
destruction rate in the data. The parameter value  is determined such that the steady
state labor supply becomes unity. See Appendix C for detail on the steady state.
The productivity process is estimated using a Solow residual such as lnAt = lnYt 
0:64 lnLt where Yt and Lt represent time series of U.S. real GDP and hours worked for
the period 1977 to 2009. The lnAt is assumed to follow an AR(1) process: lnAt =
a +  lnAt1 + t. The OLS estimation provides the value of the AR(1) coe¢cient, , as
0:98 and the standard deviation of the shock, t, as 0:019. The spillover coe¢cients of
productivity on these costs are chosen to be # = 0:25 and  = 0:50 arbitrarily. Since they
control the degree of entry and exit margins, these coe¢cients are of particular interest
and sensitivity analyses with respect to these values are performed in the following section.
5.2. Impulse response functions
Through Figure 2 to Figure 4, impulse response functions following one percent neg-
ative productivity shock, one percent permanent reduction in entry costs fE and opera-
tional Öxed costs f are reported. These are obtained for two Schumpeterian economies
(solid blue lines for the benchmark and marked green lines for the entry selection model)
and the non-Schumpeterian economy (dotted red lines). In these Ögures, vertical axes
measure percent deviations from the steady state values and horizontal axes represent
years. In addition, I present those of GDP, YR;t, consumption, CR;t, and investment,
IR;t  vR;tHt which are measured in "empirical-basis" abstracting the welfare impact
arising from áuctuations in extensive margins. Following Ghironi and Melitz (2005), any
real variable Xt measured in welfare-based CPI, Pt, are transformed to those XR;t deáated
with the empirical-based CPI, bPt, by the following operation: XR;t  PtXt= bPt.
5.2.1. Recessionary productivity shock
In the non-Schumpeterian economy, gross destruction Dt remains almost stable, how-
ever, it rises sharply in Schumpeterian economies following a recessionary shock. The
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negative shock raises Öxed operational costs on impact (captured in a rise in lt) inducing
the exit of less e¢cient Örms. Accordingly, the average productivity level of producersezs;t increases. As a result, surviving Örms can charge a lower price es;t and their proÖtseds;t and intensive margins eys;t decline less than those in the non-Schumpeterian economy.
Here, we observe the "cleansing e§ect of recessions" (Caballero and Hammour 1994). A
recessionary shock wipes less e¢cient Örms out and allocates resources toward more e¢-
cient Örms. For welfare-based consumption Ct and wages wt, however, three economies
experience a similar pattern. In the non-Schumpeterian economy, these reductions are
largely due to the reduction in intensive margins of each Örm. On the other hand, the
destruction of extensive margins St are compensated by the above mentioned smaller
reduction in intensive margins eys;t in the Schumpeterian economies.
Comparing the two Schumpeterian economies, the number of new entrants Ht de-
creases more sharply in the entry selection model than the benchmark. The average
productivity level of new entrants ezh;t rises following a recessionary shock with preselec-
tion at entry.8 Since potential producers who are going to face Schumpeterian destruction
are already somewhat e¢cient, gross destruction Dt is less pronounced and the average
productivity level of producers ezs;t rises less compared to the benchmark model.
5.2.2. Permanent entry deregulation
A permanent entry deregulation which makes sunk entry costs lower (a decline in lE;t)
boosts on impact the number of new entrants Ht who achieve a higher level at a new
steady state in all three economies. Labor demand coming from these new Örms pushes
wages wt up in the long run. A high wage rate induces the exit of less e¢cient Örms
which have failed to a§ord Öxed operational costs in the Schumpeterian economies (a rise
in Dt and ezs;t). Accordingly, e¢cient producers make higher proÖts eds;t and expand their
production scale eys;t. Although the number of producers St remains almost unchanged,
8Lee and Mukoyama (2008) report that the relative productivity of entering plants in recessions are
about 10-20% higher than that of entering plants in booms. In contrast, they Önd that the relative
productivity of exiting plants is similar across business cycle áuctuations.
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due to a simultaneous increase in both entries and destructions, Örms are more e¢cient
in a new steady state in Schumpeterian economies. In contrast, there is "sclerosis",
i.e. the survival of production units that would not survive in an e¢cient equilibrium
(Caballero and Hammour 2005) in the non-Schumpeterian economy. Producers in the
non-Schumpeterian economy make less proÖts and reduce their intensive margins due to
the non-replaced or non-renewed ine¢cient producers.9
The number of new entrants Ht rises less in the entry selection model than the bench-
mark model. With an increase in the expected future Öxed costs induced by a rise in
wt, the average productivity level of new entrants ezh;t increases as well. As is the case
for a recessionary shock, because of this preselection, the rise in gross destruction Dt and
productivity level of producers ezs;t are less pronounced in the entry selection model.
5.2.3. Permanent subsidy
Figure 4 presents impulse response functions following a permanent one percent re-
duction in Öxed operational costs f . In the Schumpeterian economies, gross destruction
Dt decreases and the number of producers St rises as a result of such a subsidy policy.
Accordingly, incumbents become less e¢cient (a decrease in ezs;t), make less proÖts eds;t
and reduce their production scale eys;t at a new steady state. Caballero et al. (2008) an-
alyze "zombie lending", i.e. Önancial support for ine¢cient Örms/zombies. They argue
that congestion created by zombies has depressed the restructuring process in Japan. The
implication of the subsidy policy considered here is very similar to that obtained under
zombie lending. Since there are no such costs, all variables in the non-Schumpeterian
economy remain at their steady state levels.
For both Schumpeterian economies, factor price wt becomes expensive because of labor
demand coming from these less e¢cient producers. In the benchmark model, such a rise in
input costs is high to the extent that it discourages Örm entry (a stable Ht). In the entry
selection model, the same policy induces a higher number of new entrants (a rise in Ht),
9In contrast to Caballero and Hammour (2005), there is no "scrambling" that reduces the e§ectiveness
of the restructuring process related to Önancial constraints of Örms.
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however, they are less e¢cient (a decrease in ezh;t), due to expected subsidies in production.
Since producers are already somewhat ine¢cient, a decrease in gross destruction Dt and
average productivity level ezs;t are less pronounced in the entry selection model compared
to the benchmark model.
5.3. Second moments of the theoretical models
Table 3: Second moments
YR CR IR L H D
St.div (%) U.S. Data 1.33 0.73 5.25 0.38 4.62 5.22
Benchmark 1.17 0.94 5.35 0.19 4.62 5.10
With entry selection 1.47 0.80 11.80 0.57 11.32 3.41
No endo. destruction 1.30 1.10 6.14 0.18 5.25 0.05
Relative U.S. Data 1 0.55 3.94 0.28 3.47 3.92
to YR Benchmark 1 0.80 4.59 0.17 3.96 4.37
With entry selection 1 0.55 8.01 0.39 7.68 2.34
No endo. destruction 1 0.85 4.74 0.14 4.05 0.04
Corr(YR: X) U.S. Data 1 0.78 0.95 0.67 0.43 -0.15
Benchmark 1 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 -1.00
With entry selection 1 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 -0.99
No endo. destruction 1 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.59
Table 3 provides second moments of principal variables for the U.S. data as well as
benchmark, entry selection and non-Schumpeterian economies.10 With the productivity
process and parametersí values previously speciÖed, both Schumpeterian economies can
be successful in reproducing a high standard deviation for destruction margins D as ob-
served in the data (3.92 relative to GDP). They are 4.37 in the benchmark and 2.34 in
10All series are detrended by HP Ölter. Smoothing parameter is set to 6.25. Second moments of the
theoretical models are computed by the frequency domain techniques proposed by Uhlig (1998). For the
U.S. series, see Appendix A.
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the entry selection model. In contrast, a non-Schumpeterian economy without endoge-
nous destruction fails to capture this empirical fact. The standard deviation for entry
margins H and investment IR become higher in the entry selection model (7.68 and 8.01)
compared to the benchmark and non-Schumpeterian economies. As has been explained in
the previous sections, these are related to entry preselection which induces higher volatil-
ity in H. The standard deviations of other variables are similar in all three models and
successful in replicating the data.
Firm entry is procyclical and exit is slightly countercyclical in the data (0.43 and -
0.15, respectively). Lee and Mukoyama (2008) also report the same pattern about U.S.
manufacturing Örms. Using a data set that contains the universe of products with bar
codes purchased by U.S. households, Broda and Weinstein (2010) document that prod-
uct creation is highly procyclical and product destruction is countercyclical but with
less important magnitude. All three models provide a procyclical pattern for entry of
variety-representing Örms, although it is more pronounced than in the data. Only the
Schumpeterian economies, however, are successful in reproducing the countercyclical pat-
tern for destruction (-1.00 in the benchmark and -0.99 in the entry selection model). The
strong cyclicality in creation and destruction margins would be related to the absence of
adjustment costs in the theoretical models. More fundamentally, as is clear, the cycli-
cality of these margins are very sensitive to cyclical properties of Öxed operational costs,
wtft=A

t , and entry costs, wtfE;t=A
#
t . I investigate this point in the next section.
6. Shock transmission
6.1. Fixed operational costs
Figure 5 shows sensitivity analyses for standard deviations and correlations of entry
and exist against the spillover coe¢cient of productivity shock on Öxed operational costs
(). The upper and lower panels are those obtained in the benchmark and entry selection
model, respectively. Both models show very similar patterns.
When  rises from 0 to 1, the correlations of destruction margins change from positive
to negative and their variances increase. Because a higher  implies more expensive
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operational costs following a negative productivity shock, destruction increases when  is
high and becomes highly volatile and countercyclical.
The same intuition extends to impulse response functions. Figure 6 provides those
obtained under  = 0:25 and  = 0:1 following a negative productivity shock as in Figure
2. As previously, when  = 0:1, there is less endogenous destruction on impact of the
shock since Öxed operational costs rise less. In particular, recovery takes place with less
destruction than the steady state level. Accordingly, the average productivity level of
surviving Örms ezs;t decreases as well. As a result, cumulative destruction decreases when
 = 0:1 while it rises when  = 0:25.
Figure 6 shows that entry margins H, which decline on impact rise slightly along
recovery in both Schumpeterian economies regardless of the value of . As a result, both
cumulative destruction and entry remain low when  = 0:1. Such a pattern is consistent
with the "reverse-liquidationist view" argued in Caballero and Hammour (2005). Recovery
takes place with a lower level of destruction rather than a higher level of creation.
6.2. Sunk entry costs
Figure 5 also reports sensitivity analyses against #, the spillover coe¢cient on sunk
entry costs. Again the upper and lower panels are those obtained in the benchmark and
entry selection model, respectively. When # rises, the negative correlation of destruction
margins with real GDP and the variance of destruction margins decreases.
The intuition would be better described by impulse response functions. Figure 7
provides those obtained under # = 0:25 and # = 0:9 for both Schumpeterian economies
following a recessionary shock as in Figure 2. Since a higher value of # implies a more
expensive entry cost under a negative shock, creation margins H experience a sharper
decrease on impact and cumulative creation becomes lower when # = 0:9, compared to
those obtained under # = 0:25. Because of such a sharp decrease in creation margins,
which alleviates the pressure on labor demand realizing a lower wage, destruction can end
up being shielded along the pass of recovery. As a result, we observe a less countercyclical
pattern of destruction when # is high as in the Figure 5. This is exactly "the insulation
e§ect of creation" on destruction margins argued in Caballero and Hammour (1994).
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Figure 7 also show the "reverse-liquidationist" pattern of recovery as is the case for lower
transmission of Öxed operational costs.
7. Conclusion
This paper investigates destruction as well as creation margins with a DSGE model
based on monopolistic competition. Destruction among variety-representing Örms endoge-
nously takes place depending on Örm-speciÖc productivity levels following shocks. The
models in the paper are capable of reproducing high Örm turnover as in the U.S. data and
the properties which are typical of models of Schumpeterian economies.
Relying on monopolistic competition, it would be relatively easy to extend the models,
especially to embody demand-driven recessions in the presence of nominal rigidities. Also,
it would be interesting to incorporate multiproduct Örms, as reported in Broda and Wein-
stein (2010) and Bernard, Redding and Schott (2006, 2010). Another important direction
would be to consider vertical as well as horizontal di§erentiation in product varieties and
see welfare consequences in a Schumpeterian environment.
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Appendix A. Data
The U.S. data about establishment entry and exit and job creation and destruction
in manufacturing sector are taken from Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) of the U.S.
Census Bureau. The series of U.S. real GDP, consumption (private plus government
expenditures), investment (Öxed capital formation), labor (hours worked) are taken from
the OECD data base.
Appendix B. Deriving the ZCPE
For the ZCPE, we argued that Etdt+1 (zh;t) = 0. This condition can be transformed
as follows:
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Etdt+1 (zh;t) = Et
St+1
Nt+1
ds;t+1 (zh;t)
= Et
St+1
Nt+1

1

S
 (1)1
t+1 
1
t+1 (zh;t)Ct+1 
wt+1ft+1
At+1

= Et
St+1
Nt+1

1

k  (  1)
k
S
 (1)1
t+1 
1
t+1 (ezh;t)Ct+1  wt+1ft+1At+1

= Et
St+1
Nt+1
"
1

k  (  1)
k
Ct+1
St+1
 ezh;tezs;t+1
1
 wt+1ft+1
At+1
#
= 0; (B.1)
where, for the third identity, I have used the equilibrium pricing conditions (20) and (19)
and, for the fourth identity, the deÖnition of the price index and real price.
Appendix C. Steady state
I start by arguing the steady state of the benchmark model. The Euler equation (8)
gives
1

= (1 )
 
1 +
ed
v
!
: (C.1)
Using (21), the ZCP (22) can be transformed as
eds
w
=
  1
k  (  1) : (C.2)
We have ed = S eds=N from (24) and v = w from the free entry condition (13). Using these
relations, (C.1) can be expressed as
1

= (1 )

1 +
S
N
  1
k  (  1)f

: (C.3)
The above equation provides the steady state Schumpeterian destruction rate, S=N , given
f .
I set the value of  so that the steady state labor supply equals to the unity. Note
also from the law of motion (3), we have H = N= (1 ). Plugging these relations in
the labor market clearing condition (26), we get
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1N
= (  1) S
N
  1
k  (  1)f + 
S
N
f +

1  (C.4)
Provided the value of S=N , the above equation yields the unique solution for N . Knowing
S, the steady state values of other variables are easily found.
For the model with entry selection, only the free entry condition is modiÖed asHv=N =
w in the above procedure. In the place of (C.3) and (C.4), we have
1

= (1 )

1 +
H
NE
S
N
  1
k  (  1)f

; (C.5)
and
1
N
= (  1) S
N
  1
k  (  1)f + 
S
N
f +

1 

H
NE
1
: (C.6)
Because there is no di§erence between entry and exit selection, the rate of destruction
in entry and exit coincides as S=N = H=NE in such a non-stochastic steady state. Pro-
vided the value of f , the above equations give the value of N and those of other variables
are easily found.
For the model without Schumpeterian destruction, it is assumed that f = 0. As a
result we have S=N = 1, ed = eds and from the Euler equation
1

= (1 )
 
1 +
eds
v
!
: (C.7)
Combined with the free entry condition and the law of motion, the labor market clearing
condition gives
1
N
= (  1)

1
 (1 )  1

+

1  : (C.8)
The above equation determines the value of N . It is relatively easy to Önd the steady
state value for other variables.
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